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\section %hack for vim-latexsuite
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\end{comment}
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In this thesis, we presented new cryptographic schemes that relies on lattice or pairing assumptions.
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In this thesis, we presented new cryptographic schemes that rely on lattice or pairing assumptions.
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These contributions focus on the design and analysis of new cryptographic schemes that target privacy-preserving applications.
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In pairing-related cryptography, we propose a practical dynamic group signature scheme, for which security is well understood.
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It relies on broadly used assumptions with simple statements that exists for more than ten years.
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This work is also supported by an implementation in C.
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In pairing-based cryptography, we propose a practical dynamic group signature scheme, for which security is well understood.
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It relies on broadly used assumptions with simple statements which exist for more than ten years.
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This work is also supported by an implementation in \texttt{C}.
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Our work in the lattice work give rise of three fundamental schemes that were missing in the landscape of lattice-based privacy-preserving primitives.
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Our work in the lattice setting gives rise to three fundamental schemes that were missing in the landscape of lattice-based privacy-preserving cryptography.
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Even if these schemes suffer from some efficiency issues due to their novelty, we do believe that it's one step toward a quantum-secure privacy-friendly world.
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In the way of doing it, improvements have been made in the state of zero-knowledge proofs in the lattice setting as well as providing building blocks that, we believe, are of independent interest.
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As of our signature with efficient protocols, which have been used to provide a lattice-based e-cash system~\cite{LLNW17}.
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In the way of doing it, improvements have been made in the state of the art of zero-knowledge proofs in the lattice setting as well as providing building blocks that, we believe, are of independent interest.
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As of our signature with efficient protocols, it has already been used to design a lattice-based e-cash system~\cite{LLNW17}.
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All these works are proven under strong security model within simple assumptions.
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This made a breeding ground for new theoretical constructions, as well as going toward practicality.
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@@ -21,16 +21,16 @@ This made a breeding ground for new theoretical constructions, as well as going
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\section*{Open Problems}
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The path of providing new cryptographic primitives and proving them is disseminated with pitfalls.
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The most obvious questions that stem from this work are about how to tackle the compromises we made in the design of those primitives.
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The most obvious questions that stem from this work are about how to tackle the trade-offs we made in the design of those primitives.
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\begin{question}
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Is it possible to build an adaptive oblivious transfer with access control secure under $\LWE$ with polynomially large modulus?
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\end{question}
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In other words, is it possible to avoid the use of smudging to guarantee message-privacy in the oblivious transfer scheme of~\cref{ch:ot-lwe}.
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As is, this problem arises from the use of Regev's encryption scheme, which does not guarantee this message privacy.
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As is, this issue arises from the use of Regev's encryption scheme, which does not guarantee this message privacy.
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However, finer analysis on GSW ciphertexts~\cite{GSW13} seems promising to achieve this at reasonable cost~\cite{BDPMW16}.
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Then, the main difficulty is to have compatible zero-knowledge proof with the access control and the encryption layers.
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Then, the main difficulty is to have zero-knowledge proofs compatible with the access control and the encryption layers.
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\subsection*{Zero-Knowledge Proofs}
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@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Then, the main difficulty is to have compatible zero-knowledge proof with the ac
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\end{question}
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Extending the work of Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai~\cite{GOS06} in the lattice setting would be a great improvement for lattice-based privacy-preserving cryptography.
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Recent line of work goes toward this direction~\cite{RSS18}, but relies on non-existing primitive yet ($\NIZK$ proofs for a variant of the bounded decoding distance problem).
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Recent line of work goes toward this direction~\cite{RSS18}, but relies on primitives that do not exist yet ($\NIZK$ proofs for a variant of the bounded decoding distance problem).
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The Stern-like proof system we work on in during this thesis, despite being flexible enough to prove a large variety of statements, suffers from the stiffness of being combinatorial.
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The choice of permutations used to ensure zero-knowledgeness (and so witness-indistinguishability) is quite strict, and force the challenge space to be ternary.
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@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ Actually, even the question of having a trapdoorless \textsf{IND-CCA2} public ke
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Can we achieve better security proofs for cryptographic schemes?
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\end{question}
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Our work during this thesis also focus on the proof of cryptographic schemes.
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Our work during this thesis also focuses on the security proofs of cryptographic schemes.
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As explained in~\cref{ch:proofs}, it is important to rely on simple assumptions to prove strong security notions.
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Given the advances in cryptographic proofs~\cite{Hof16,KMP16,Hof17}, it is now possible to attain stronger security notions than what was claim before~\cite{DSYC18}.
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Another line of work looks at the quality of the reduction, aiming for \textit{tight security}~\cite{GHKW16,AHN+17}.
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This improves the understanding of the link between the cryptographic scheme and the security assumption, leading to more reliable schemes.
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Given recent advances in cryptographic proofs~\cite{Hof16,KMP16,Hof17}, it is now possible to attain stronger security notions than what was claim before~\cite{DSYC18}.
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Another line of work targets the quality of the reduction, aiming for \textit{tight security}~\cite{GHKW16,AHN+17}.
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This improves the understanding of the links between cryptographic schemes and security assumptions, leading to more reliable constructions.
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