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Structure: move chapters definition to main.tex

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Fabrice Mouhartem 2018-04-13 15:49:21 +02:00
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11 changed files with 35 additions and 31 deletions
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chap-GE-LWE.tex
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\chapter{Lattice-Based Group Encryption}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Chiffrement de groupe à base de réseaux euclidiens}

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chap-GS-LWE.tex
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\chapter{Lattice-Based Dynamic Group Signatures}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Signatures de groupe dynamique à base de réseaux euclidiens}
\label{ch:gs-lwe}

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chap-GS-background.tex
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\chapter{Dynamic Group Signatures} \label{ch:gs-background}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Signatures de groupe dynamique}
In this Part, we will present two constructions for dynamic group signatures. In this Part, we will present two constructions for dynamic group signatures.
The construction that will be explained in \cref{ch:sigmasig} is an adaptation of the Libert, Peters and Yung short group signature in the standard model from classical pairing assumptions~\cite{LPY15} into the random oracle model to gain efficiency, while keeping the assumptions simple. The construction that will be explained in \cref{ch:sigmasig} is an adaptation of the Libert, Peters and Yung short group signature in the standard model from classical pairing assumptions~\cite{LPY15} into the random oracle model to gain efficiency, while keeping the assumptions simple.
This gives us a constant-size group signature scheme that is competitive with other construction based on less standard assumptions. This gives us a constant-size group signature scheme that is competitive with other construction based on less standard assumptions.

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chap-OT-LWE.tex
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\chapter{Lattice-Based Oblivious Transfer with Access Control} \label{ch:ac-ot}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Transfert inconscient adaptatif avec contrôle d'accès à base de réseaux euclidiens}

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chap-ZK.tex
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\chapter{Zero-Knowledge Arguments}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Arguments à divulgation nulle de connaissance}
A \textit{Zero-Knowledge proof}~\cite{GMR85} (or \textbf{ZK proofs}) is an \textit{interactive proof} between a prover and a verifier at the end of which the verifier should be convinced of the truth of a statement (within some probability, called \emph{soundness error}), while the prover is guaranteed that the verifier learns nothing more that the authenticity of the statement. A \textit{Zero-Knowledge proof}~\cite{GMR85} (or \textbf{ZK proofs}) is an \textit{interactive proof} between a prover and a verifier at the end of which the verifier should be convinced of the truth of a statement (within some probability, called \emph{soundness error}), while the prover is guaranteed that the verifier learns nothing more that the authenticity of the statement.
One of the early applications of \ZK proofs in cryptography is for identification systems~\cite{FS86}. One of the early applications of \ZK proofs in cryptography is for identification systems~\cite{FS86}.

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chap-conclusion.tex
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\chapter*{Conclusion}
\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Conclusion}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{Conclusion}

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chap-proofs.tex
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\chapter{Security Proofs in Cryptography} \label{ch:proofs}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Les preuves de sécurité en cryptographie}
Provable security is a subfield of cryptography where constructions are proven secure with regards to a security model. Provable security is a subfield of cryptography where constructions are proven secure with regards to a security model.
To illustrate this notion, let us take the example of public-key encryption schemes. To illustrate this notion, let us take the example of public-key encryption schemes.
This primitive consists in three algorithms:~\textit{key generation}, \textit{encryption} and \textit{decryption}. This primitive consists in three algorithms:~\textit{key generation}, \textit{encryption} and \textit{decryption}.

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chap-publications.tex
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\chapter*[Publication List]{List of Publications}
\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{List of publications}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{Liste des publications}
\section*{International Conferences} \section*{International Conferences}
\begin{description} \begin{description}
\item[\cite{LMPY16}] Benoît Libert, \textbf{Fabrice Mouhartem}, Thomas Peters, Moti Yung. \item[\cite{LMPY16}] Benoît Libert, \textbf{Fabrice Mouhartem}, Thomas Peters, Moti Yung.

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chap-sigmasig.tex
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\chapter{Pairing-Based Dynamic Group Signatures}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Signatures de groupe dynamique à base de couplages}
\label{ch:sigmasig}
%-------------------------------------------------- %--------------------------------------------------
In this chapter, we aim at lifting the \textit{signature with efficient protocols} from~\cite{LPY15} into the random oracle model in order to get an efficient construction. In this chapter, we aim at lifting the \textit{signature with efficient protocols} from~\cite{LPY15} into the random oracle model in order to get an efficient construction.
Signatures with efficient protocols in the Camenish and Lysyanskaya fashion~\cite{CL04} are digital signatures that comes with companion zero-knowledge proofs that allows a signature holder to prove Signatures with efficient protocols in the Camenish and Lysyanskaya fashion~\cite{CL04} are digital signatures that comes with companion zero-knowledge proofs that allows a signature holder to prove

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chap-structures.tex
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\chapter{Underlying Structures}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Structures sous-jacentes}
\label{ch:structures}
In the previous chapter, we saw that theoretical cryptography has to rely on \emph{computational hardness assumptions}. In the previous chapter, we saw that theoretical cryptography has to rely on \emph{computational hardness assumptions}.
Beside \emph{information theory-base cryptography}, most hardness assumptions are built on top of algebraic structures. Beside \emph{information theory-base cryptography}, most hardness assumptions are built on top of algebraic structures.
For instance the discrete logarithm assumption (Definition~\ref{de:DLP}) is based on a cyclic group structure. For instance the discrete logarithm assumption (Definition~\ref{de:DLP}) is based on a cyclic group structure.

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main.tex
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\addcontentsline{tof}{part}{\protect\numberline{\thepart} Préliminaires} \addcontentsline{tof}{part}{\protect\numberline{\thepart} Préliminaires}
} }
\chapter{Security Proofs in Cryptography} \label{ch:proofs}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Les preuves de sécurité en cryptographie}
\input chap-proofs \input chap-proofs
\chapter{Underlying Structures}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Structures sous-jacentes}
\label{ch:structures}
\input chap-structures \input chap-structures
\chapter{Zero-Knowledge Arguments}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Arguments à divulgation nulle de connaissance}
\input chap-ZK \input chap-ZK
\cleardoublepage \cleardoublepage
@ -117,10 +127,21 @@
\addcontentsline{tof}{part}{\protect\numberline{\thepart} Signatures de groupe et accréditations anonymes} \addcontentsline{tof}{part}{\protect\numberline{\thepart} Signatures de groupe et accréditations anonymes}
} }
\chapter{Dynamic Group Signatures} \label{ch:gs-background}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Signatures de groupe dynamique}
\input chap-GS-background \input chap-GS-background
\chapter{Pairing-Based Dynamic Group Signatures}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Signatures de groupe dynamique à base de couplages}
\label{ch:sigmasig}
\input chap-sigmasig \input chap-sigmasig
\chapter{Lattice-Based Dynamic Group Signatures}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Signatures de groupe dynamique à base de réseaux euclidiens}
\label{ch:gs-lwe}
\input chap-GS-LWE \input chap-GS-LWE
\cleardoublepage \cleardoublepage
@ -130,12 +151,26 @@
\addcontentsline{tof}{part}{\protect\numberline{\thepart} Chiffrement de groupe et transfert inconscient adaptatif} \addcontentsline{tof}{part}{\protect\numberline{\thepart} Chiffrement de groupe et transfert inconscient adaptatif}
} }
\chapter{Lattice-Based Group Encryption}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Chiffrement de groupe à base de réseaux euclidiens}
\input chap-GE-LWE \input chap-GE-LWE
\chapter{Lattice-Based Oblivious Transfer with Access Control} \label{ch:ac-ot}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{\thechapter} Transfert inconscient adaptatif avec contrôle d'accès à base de réseaux euclidiens}
\input chap-OT-LWE \input chap-OT-LWE
\chapter*{Conclusion}
\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Conclusion}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{Conclusion}
\input chap-conclusion \input chap-conclusion
\chapter*[Publication List]{List of Publications}
\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{List of publications}
\addcontentsline{tof}{chapter}{Liste des publications}
\input chap-publications \input chap-publications
\bibliographystyle{alphaabbr} \bibliographystyle{alphaabbr}